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1968-Year of Inflation
Ii)
I RODUCTION MD INCOME rose rapidly dur-
ing 1968, and employment remained at high levels.
The major economic problem of the year was infla-
tion, generated by an excessive demand for goods and
services. By the latter part of 1968 average prices
were 4 per cent higher than a year earlier and 12
per cent above those in late 1964,
Iki.ck ground. of tn/tati•on~
The current inflationary upswing began about
four years ago, after an extended period of near price
stability. From 1957 to 1964 overall prices rose at
an average 1.6 per cent annual rate. This was in
sharp contrast to the rapid 6 per cent rate of infla-
tion during World War II and the 3.5 per cent
average rise of prices from 1946 to 1957.
Prices probably increased even less during the
1957 to 1964 period than indicated by the trend rates
of the indices. Quality improvements and price dis-
counts may not have been given proper weight in
computing average measures, and any shifts of
demand to new, less expensive, substitute products
would cause the price rise to be overstated by a
general index.
The relative stability of prices from 1957 to 1964
reflected the fact that total demand for goods and
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services grew only slightly faster than the productive
capabilities of the economy. From 1957 to 1964 total
demand rose at an average 5.3 per cent annual rate
while real output was increasing at a 3.6 per cent
rate. Total demand did not rise evenly during this
period. Although pauses in demand growth in 1958
and 1960 were helpful in extinguishing inflationary
expectations and pressures, there was a cost in terms
of unemployed resources.
Since 1964 spending growth has accelerated, and
inflationary pressures have again intensified. Total
demand for goods and services, which had risen at
a 5.3 per cent annual rate from 1957 to 1964, increased
at an average 8 per cent rate from 1964 to 1968.
Productive capacity increased at an estimated 4 per
cent rate, Overall prices, after creeping up at the
1.6 per cent rate from 1957 to 1964, rose 1.7 per
cent in 1965, 3.3 per cent in 1966, 3.2 per cent in
1967, and about 4 per cent in 1968. Effective prices
may have accelerated more than these figures indi-
cate, for when demands are excessive, discounts and
rebates are eliminated, and there is a tendency to
reduce quality standards. In the preparation of price
indices, some of these developments may not have
been detected, since producers do not like to dis-
close their complete discount policies or a deteriora-
tion of product quality.
(~f:th-~frito! on..
The period of excessive demand for goods and
services paralleled the nation’s growing participa-
tion in the Vietnam war. During 1964, before the
major military buildup, total demand for goods and
services was large and expanding, and by year end
production was at near capacity. Government out-
lays for military goods rose from $50 billion in 1964
to an estimated $79 billion in 1988, a 12 per cent
annual rate of increase. Total real output grew at a
5 per cent rate during this period, so that a steadily
greater proportion of the nation’s production was
utilized in the defense effort.
Even though national policy allocated an increas-
ing share of the nation’s product to war materials at
a time when resources were fully utilized, excessive
total demands could have been avoided. One metbod
of financing the Vietnam effort and avoiding inflation
would have been for the Government to reduce other,
Page 3lower priority programs. However, national policy
dictated the opposite — a guns plus butter program.
Welfare and other Government expenditures were
accelerated during the military build-up. From 1964
to 1968 nondefense outlays of the Federal Govern-
ment ro~eat an 11 per cent annual rate. This was
more than double the rate of increase in real produc-
tion and slightly greater than the 9.8 per cent trend
rate of nondefense Government spending from 1957
to 1964.
Government spending on nondefense activities
during the Vietnam conflict has been much greater
than during the Korean action. At the peak of spend-
ing for each conflict, total U.S. Government outlays
amounted to slightly over 21 per cent of gross na-
tional product. Defense expenditures during the
Korean action rose to over 13 per cent of total prod-
uct while in the Vietnam war they amounted to
about 9 per cent. In the earlier period nondefense
Government outlays were cut from about 10 per cent
of total product to about 8 per cent. During the
Vietnam conflict welfare a n d other nondefense
spending continued to take an increasing share of
total output, increasing from about 10.5 per cent to 12
per cent.
A second method of financing the greater expen-
ditures while avoiding inflationary pressures would
have been for the Government to increase taxes of
businesses and individuals as was done in the Korean
action. Additional revenue would have provided
funds for enlarged expenditures while tax payments
would have reduced the spending ability of the
private sector by a roughly corresponding amount.
US Government Spending
as a Per Cent of Toted Spending
PerCent bOde Pa Ce:
llowever, until mid-1968, Federal income tax rates
were not increased. In fact, the Government did the
opposite by reducing such taxes in 1964 and again
in 1965.
A third method of financing thc increased Gov-
ernusent outlays while minimizing inflationary pres-
sures would have been for the Government to
borrow the additional funds from the private, non-
banking sector. This would have required an in-
crease in in t e r e 5 t rates, would have induced
increased saving and would have curtailed invest-
ment. In this way, the larger Government spending
would have been offset by a decrease in the outlays
of businesses and consumers.
The benefits of non-inflationary borrowing of funds
from the public must be weighed against the dis-
ruptive effects of rapidly changing interest rates.
At times of heavy borrowing, interest rates probably
would have risen sharply in order to attract the
required funds from reduced private spending. Nev-
ertheless, financing the Government deficit from
saving might have fostered lower average interest
rates over the past four years since total demands
for goods and services and inflationary pressures
would have been less. The problem of instability of
interest rates was intensified by the fact that the
Government (the largest borrower) concentrated its
fund raising in a few large issues, most of which
were at pre-determined rates. Concentration of bor-
rowing not only tended to aggravate short-run fluc-
tuations in market rates, but the rigidity of terms
plus the presumed desirability of avoiding any Gov-
ernment financing failures placed an “even keel”
constraint on monetary actions.
Interest rates rose but not sufficiently in the short
run to attract enough new saving and to discourage
enough private investment to finance the Govern-
ment outlays. Yields on highest-grade corporate
bonds increased from 4.40 per cent in 1964 to 6.15
per cent in 1968. However, in view of the inflation,
real interest rates may have risen litfie, if at all.
When prices are expected to rise, potential suppliers
of loan funds must be offered a higher return to
protect the purchasing power of their funds. Busi-
nesses are not discouraged from borrowing at the
higher rates if they expect to repay in cheaper dollars
and if they anticipate that postponed projects will
cost more later.
A fourth way of financing expenditures is to create
money. A large portion of the greater Government
outlays was accompanied by creation of funds
through an expansion of bank credit, The Federal
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Reserve System was able to moderate upward move-
ments in interest rates temporarily by buying securi-
ties, and these actions provided commercial banks
with reserves which permitted them to expand their
loans and investments. Federal Reserve credit ex-
panded at a9per cent annual rate from 1964 to
1988 after rising at a 7 per cent rate from 1957 to
1964. Commercial bank credit, other than that
matched by an increase in time deposits, rose at a
4 per cent annual rate from 1964 to 1968. From 1957
to 1964 this credit had grown at a 1.8 per cent rate.
“Manufacturing” money seemed less painful than
cutting desired Government programs, raising taxes,
or permitting an early increase in interest rates.
Creation of spending power by expanding bank
credit increased the ability of the Government to
spend without reducing other dollar outlays. As a
result, total dollar demands became excessive, and
the rationing of the limited supply of goods and
services was accomplished in the market by rising
prices.
From 1964 to mid-1968 there was only one brief
period of about six months when increased Govern-
ment expenditures were not accompanied by a large
expansion of the money supply. This was during the
summer and fall of 1966, when the money supply
changed little on balance. At first, interest rates rose
markedly as the competition for available funds be-
came keen. Some private projects could not be
financed and had to be postponed. Partially because
of legal ceilings on certain interest rates, the ration-
ing severely affected financial intermediaries and the
housing industry.
The 1966 period of financial “crunch” received
much adverse publicity, and the moderation in
money growth was not pursued long enough to elim-
inate the inflation. Yet, in late 1966 and early 1967
inflationary forces moderated, and, with reduced in-
flationary expectations, interest rates fell. Conditions
for financial intermediaries and the housing industry
improved as market interest rates declined below
legal ceilings.
Effects of Inflation
Inflation, by reducing the purchasing power of
dollars, bonds and other fixed dollar claims of con-
sumers and businesses, is one way of financing Gov-
ernment spending. Some observers believe t ha
inflation may be the most acceptable alternative.
Since some effects of inflation are apparent only with
a lag, it seems easier to spend from created funds
than to reduce other Government outlays, raise
taxes, or permit interest rates to seek their equilibrium
levels. Inflation, like higher taxes, spreads the burden
of Government expenditures broadly. As long as de-
mands for goods and services are excessive, most
workers find employment, and businesses appear to
thrive.
Some individuals and businesses may reduce the
adverse effects of inflation on themselves by holding
assets in the form of equities rather than debt in-
struments, by borrowing, and by putting cost-of-living
escalators in wage and other contracts. However, the
success of inflation as a means of financing Govern-
ment expenditures depends upon a great many
holdings of fixed dollar assets by a public which
cannot or does not find alternatives.
Inflation reduces the value of the dollar and fixed
dollar claims relative to other assets, redistributing
wealth.’ Declines in the relative value of fixed dol-
1lrving Fisher noted on page 61 of his book The Money
Illusion (New York: Adelphi Company, 1928), that: “It
might be argued that no harm can be done to society as a
whole either by inflation or deflation since the average wealth
would not be changed. But one might as well reason that
when a bank vault is robbed or when your house is
burglarized, society is none the poorer.”
Page 5Ear claims reduce the attractiveness of placing funds
in financial intermediaries. Since those with small
savings have few satisfactory alternatives to financial
institutions for their savings, the total amount of
real saving may be reduced. Changing relative
values of assets also makes speculation in inven-
tories, stocks, and land more attractive relative to
production.
Since inflation encourages the demand for saving
relative to its supply, market interest rates are driven
up. Much of the rise in nominal interest rates in the
United States since 1964 may be explained by in-
creasing inflationary expectations. Market interest
rates have usually been higher in countries where
prices have risen faster than in the United States.
Inflation has been a regressive “tax,” tending to
bear more heavily on those in the lower income
brackets than a progressive income tax. Those with
little wealth have not been able to protect them-
selves as well as those with greater means. In-
dividuals with little net worth derive most of their
income from wages, pensions, and other sources,
many of which adjust slowly to inflation. By con-
trast, the wealthy derive more of their income from
profits, which respond quickly to excessive de-
mands and price changes. Savings of those with
relatively small means are mostly in fixed dollar
liabilities of financial institutions and U.S. savings
bonds. The wealthy hold a larger portion of their
assets in stocks, land, and commodities. Most private
borrowing is by businesses and individuals with sub-
stantial net worth, and with inflation repayments are
made in depreciated dollars.
Greater profit opportunities and higher levels of
employment which accompany early stages of infla-
tion are probably temporary. Although an accelera-
tion of the demand for goods and services tends to
stimulate production and employment, these bene-
fits probably cannot be maintained without contin-
ually accelerating the rate of inflation. Once the
inflationary expectations are fully anticipated and
digested, interest rates and other prices rise to levels
where investment and employment tend to fall back
toward their long-run equilibrium even though the
rate of inflation continues unabated.
Trade-offs between prices and employment (the
so-called Phillips curve) occur because of a money
illusion of spending power. However, as prices
adjust to the new supply and demand conditions,
the stimulative effects of the existing rate of inflation
are dissipated. Ultimately, total employment de-
pends on the number of people in the labor force
and their ability to produce compared with wages
sought, together with a great multitude of institu-
tional arrangements. Prices, on the other hand, re-
flect the relationship between total dollar demand
and the volume of goods and services available.
Rising domestic prices and costs of production re-
duce the value of the dollar relative to foreign
currencies. With higher costs of production, compe-
tition with foreign producers becomes more difficult.
In 1964 the nation’s exports of goods and services
exceeded imports by $8.4 billion. After 1964, as
inflation accelerated, this excess declined, gradually
falling to an annual rate of $1.7 billion in the first
half of 1968 (See chart on page 16 of the article “U.S.
Balance of Payments in 1968” in this Review.) Dur-
ing this period imports of goods rose at a 16 per cent
annual rate, while exports increased at a7per cent
rate,
1 Ofl.UOtV)fl •A .scar ;4r;r,
As the year 1967 ended, the greatest domestic
economic problem appeared to be inflation. The
December 1967 issue of this Review pointed out:
“Conditions at year-end indicate that stabiliza-
tion problems will present a formidable chal-
lenge during the year 1968. Late in 1967,
spending is rising twice as fast as productive
resources, prices are increasing in response to
both past and current demands, market interest
rates have risen to the point where many con-
cerns were threatened by legal and institutional
rigidities, balance of payments problems con-
tinue, and both monetary and fiscal influences
are more stimulative than at any time in two
decades.”
An initial problem in 1968 will probably be to
contain excessive demands for g oods and
services.”
The Economic Report of the President, released in
early 1968, stated that:
“Most experienced observers agree that the pace
(of economic activity) now is — and in the
months ahead will be — too fast for safety. The
gain in gross national product in the current
quarter is generally expected to be one of the
largest in our history — a record we could gladly
do without at this time. ...I therefore urgently
renew my request that Congress enact a tem-
porary 10 per cent surcharge on corporate and
individual income taxes.”2
2
Economie Report of the President, Febmary 1968, pp. 9
and 10.
Page 6On December 12, 1967, to the Federal Open Mar-
ket Committee, “it appeared highly probable that
growth in overall activity would accelerate in early
1968 and the upward pressures on prices would per-
sist as the effects of higher costs were reinforced by
those of rapidly expanding demands.” Asa conse-
quence, the manager of the monetary system’s Open
Market Account was directed “. . . to moving slightly
beyond the firmer conditions that had developed in
the money markets. ..“3
Stabthzoti.on z4eti.onsn~.the First I.ioff of 1968
Despite the recognized desirability of taking ac-
tions to reduce the excessive demands, both fiscal
and monetary influences continued expansionary in
the first half of 1968. Fiscal restraint was delayed
while Congress and the President debated the rel-
ative merits of a tax increase or spending cuts. Mone-
tary authorities, observing rising interest rates and
fearful of the effects on the nation’s financial institu-
tions, on construction, and on other sectors if interest
rates rose substantially further, continued the rapid
monetary growth.
The high-employment budget, a measure of Gov-
ernment fiscal policy, was at an annual rate of deficit
of $14 billion in the first half of 1968. This was $2
billion greater than in the corresponding period a
year earlier and $8 billion more expansionary than
in 1964, the year of the tax cut designed to en-
courage economic expansion. The first half rate of
deficit amounted to a shift of about $25 billion from
the 1960 through 1964 period of balanced economic
expansion when there ‘vas an average surplus of $11
billion a year.
‘lAt,rcuol R port of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Re.en~ Sy ton for 1967 pp. 199-205.
Federal Budget Infiuence
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Government debt management operations were
also more expansionary in the first half of 1968. Be
cause of the I gal maximum interest rate of 4¼ per
cent on new issues with matunties over seven years
the Treasury was forced to finance with relatively
short-term issues adding to the liquid assets of the
public. Average maturity of the public debt de-
clined from 62 months in 1964 to 53 months in 1967
and to 50 months in June 1968.
Monetary aggregates ‘iceelerated during the spring
of 1968 from an already very expansionary rate.
Growth in the nation’s money supply consisting of
private demand deposits and currency after slow-
ing from November 1967 to March quickened in
the second quarter. Fluctuations in the growth rate
of money reflected m’iny developments (See Table I).
One factor was a build-up of Treasury deposits (not
included in mone supply) in the winter, followed
by a sharp decline in the spring and early summer.
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The money supply increased at a 6.8 per cent
annual rate in the first half of 1968, following a rise
of 6.4 per cent in 1967. From 1964 to 1967 the
money stock increased at an average 4.1 per cent
rate, and from 1957 to 1964 the trend growth was
at a 1.9 per cent rate. The major factor causing the
sharp rise in money in the first half of 1968 was
Federal Reserve System actions. Federal Reserve
credit by itself provided for an increase of money
at a 19 per cent annual rate.
The supply of money rose faster than the amount
of money demanded. When money exceeds the de-
mand for money to hold, there are incentives to
eliminate the discrepancy by spending the excess
on goods, services or financial assets, A review of
changes in the money supply and spending since
early 1953 indicates that the demand for money to
hold has usually risen at a fairly steady rate.4 In the
first half of 1968, the demand for money as an asset
may have risen more than usual, as income, wealth
and transactions rose. A partial offset was probably
caused by the fact that rising interest rates increased
the alternative cost of holding money balances.
Not only the quantity of money but other mone-
4See “Economic Pause, Acceleration and Excesses — 1967
in Retrospect” by Norman N. Bowsher in the December
1967 issue of this Review, pp. 14-16.
tary aggregates as well rose very rapidly in early
1968, compared with the 1957 to 1964 trend rates
or the 1964 to 1967 rates when inflationary pressures
were building up.
Money plus time deposits and bank credit, al-
though increasing substantially in the first half of
1968, rose less rapidly than in the 1964 to 1967
period. The slower growth rates of these broad
measures can be attributed chiefly to the behavior
of time deposits in the second quarter of 1968. The
rates of interest that commercial banks are permitted
to pay on savings and other time deposits are gov-
erned by Regulation Q. In the spring of 1968 market
interest rates rose relative to the ceiling rates of
Regulation Q, and banks could not effectively com-
pete for these funds. Consequently, the normal
channels of the flow of funds from saver to investor
were disrupted, and some funds bypassed commer-
cial banks by going directly into Treasury bills, com-
mercial paper and other instruments. Growth of total
commercial bank deposits and of total bank credit
was moderated, but total liquid assets and total
credit extended (bank plus nonbank) was probably
affected little by Regulation Q. The interruption of
the normal flows probably reduced the efficiency of
the financial system, and may have favored the Gov.
ernment and other large borrowers, who obtain funds
Table II
Growth Rates of Selected Monetary Aggregates
(Annual Rates of Change)
Dec. 1967 to 1964 to 1957 to
June 1968 1967 1Q64
Feao,at R,tuerve Credit 13.0”, 8.1% 7.4~”
Total Mambor Bank Reserves 5.3 4.8 2.8
Reterve, Avalablo for
Priv’,tc, Demand Deposits 6.3 2.8 1.2
Monetary Bose 6.6 .4.9 2.7
Demand Deposit
Component of Money 6.5 3.7 1.8
Monoy Supply 6.8 4.1 1.9
Money St~pplyplus
T,me Deposits 6.0 8.2 5.3
Bank Cred,t 8.3 8.8 6.4
Table Ill
Percentile Rank of Growth Rates of
Monetary Aggregates1
June 1968 Dec. 1967
to to
Oct1968 June 1968
Foderol Reserve Credit 70 86
Total Mambo, Bank Reserves 89 78
Reserves Avoiobie for Prvote
Demand Depouits 39 91
Monetary Bate 90 92
Demand Depost Component of Money 72 92
Money Supply 80 93
Money Supply plus T,me Deposits 97 62
Bank Credit 98 68
‘All ~ ir.ur.r,,,,r.th tIll ,n_n,, nth 1.r’:.’d~ fl’..rn
.1 tim.t,rv 3943 to October 1905.
Changes in the Treasury’s cash balances cause op-
posite movements in private deposits (money), but
over longer periods they have had little net effect,
since the Treasury seeks to keep its average cash
holdings at a practical minimum which changes little
over time.
Page 8in the capital markets, relative to consumers, small
businesses and real estate buyers, who rely more
heavily on local financial institutions,
The rapidity of growth of monetary aggregates
during the first half of 1968 may be measured by
comparing their growth rates at this time with those
of all other six-month periods in the last two decades.
For example, the 6.8 per cent rate of increase in
money in the first half of 1968 (See Table II) ranked
in the 93rd percentile among 238 consecutive six-
month periods (Table III).
.Fconomic Activity in the First Half Year
Stimulated by the expansionary fiscal and mone-
tary developments of late 1967 and early 1968, total
spending accelerated in the first half of 1968. De-
mand for goods and services rose at an 11 per cent
annual rate, a sharp acceleration from the 8 per
cent rate of the previous six months. From 1964 to
1967 demand had increased at a 7.7 per cent rate,
and from 1957 to 1964 it grew at a 5.3 per cent
trend rate.
The demand for goods and services was strong
in every major sector of the economy. In the first
half of 1968, consumer spending rose at a 10.5 per
cent annual rate, business spending at a 9.2 per
cent rate, and Government purchases at a 16.4 per
cent rate. Business outlays on inventories were par-
ticularly heavy in the second quarter, but the in-
ventory-sales ratio was lower at mid-year than it was
six months earlier.
In response to the strong demand, production con-
tinued to expand in early 1968, despite shortages of
efficient workers, bottlenecks due to capacity limi-
tations, and labor strikes. Total real output increased
at a 6.4 per cent annual rate in the first half of
1968. During the Vietnam build-up from 1964 to
1967, production increased at a 5 per cent rate, and
from 1957 to 1964 it grew at a 3.6 per cent rate.
Over the long run the maximum growth in produc-
Table IV
Growth Rates of Selected Business Indicators
Annual Rates of ~hange~
Dec. 1967 to 1964 to 1957 to
June1968 1967 , 1964
Total Spcndirg 10.6. 7.7 . 5.3
Business Spending 9.2 67 4.8
Canst.’mer Spendtng 10.5 7.1 5.2
Governmert Spending 164 11.5 5.8
Peat Product,on 6.4 5.0 3.6
Industrial Prad~ction 4.1 6.1 4.0
Total Employment 1 3 2.4 1.1
Poyroil Employment 2.9 4.2 1.4
Personal Income 9 8 8.1 5.1
Consbmer Prices 4.6 2.5 1.4
Wholesale Prices 3 6 1.8 0.2
Overall Prices 3.9 2.5 1.6
Demand and Production
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tion is determined primarily by improved technology
and by increases in the labor force and capital goods.
From recent growth rates in these resources it is
estimated that capacity has been going up at about
a 4 per cent annual rate in recent years. Rates of
increase in output in excess of the trend growth in
capacity are unsustainable.
Employment rose at about the same pace as the
population of working force age in the first half of
1968. Most entrants into the labor force were able to
find work, many jobs remained unfilled, and unem-
ployment remained a relatively low 3.6 per cent of
the labor force. Among married men, unemployment
averaged 1.6 per cent.
The strong demand for qualified workers tended
to drive up wage rates, creating an illusion of un-
usually large increases in real income. Average
hourly earnings in manufacturing rose at a 6 per cent
annual rate in the first six months of 1968 compared
with a trend rate of 3.3 per cent from 1957 to 1967.
Disposable income (income after taxes), measured
in current dollars, increased at a 10 per cent annual
rate in the first half of 1968. From 1964 to 1967
after-tax income rose at a 7.6 per cent rate while
from 1957 to 1964 it increased at a 5.1 per cent
rate. Yet, in terms of purchasing power, disposable
income grew little faster in early 1968 (5.6 per cent
rate) than in the previous decade (4.2 per cent
trend), and many on relatively fixed incomes found
their real income declining.
Although funds available for lending rose in early
1968, demands for credit were sufficient to drive up
interest rates. Nominal incomes were large, and the
proportion saved was high. Saving amounted to 7.4
Page 9Interest Rates
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per (slit (hI income after taxes in the first half of
1968, compared with an average rate of 6 per cent
from 1959 through 1967. Bank credit expansion, not
matched by increased time deposits, was sizable,
rising at a 6.5 per cent annual rate compared with
a 2.4 per cent trend rate from 1957 to 1967.
Interest rates on highest-grade corporate bonds
averaged 6,28 per cent in June compared with 6.19
per cent in December 1967, 440 per cent in 1964,
and 3.89 per cent in 1957. Yields on three-month
Treasury bills averaged 552 per cent in June com-
pared with 4.96 per cent in December 1967, 3.54
per cent in 1964, and 3.22 per cent in 1957. The
Federal Reserve Banks increased their discount rates,
the interest rate on advances to member banks,
from 41/2 per cent to 5 per cent in March and to 5½
per cent in April in an effort to keep these rates in
line with other rates.
The strong demand for credit reflected the large
Government deficits and inflationary expectations as
well as the relatively high and rising level of produc-
tion. The Federal Government’s borrowings from the
public, seasonally adjusted, amounted to an $8 billion
annual rate during the first half of 1968. From 1960
through 1967 net borrowings averaged $2 billion
per year. Further, with the growing expectations for
inflation, private borrowers were willing to pay higher
rates since repayments were expected to be made
in cheaper dollars and any project postponed would
be likely to cost more later.
Stabilization Actions During the Summer
On May 30, President Johnson delivered an ad-
5
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dress to the nation, reasserting a need for and
strongly recommending a 10 per cent surtax on cor-
porate and individual incomes. In this speech he
stated a willingness to accept planned Government
spending for fiscal 1969, some $6 billion less than
provided in the budget message, in order to obtain
the tax increase. The fiscal package was subsequently
signed into law in late June and was implemented
shortly thereafter.
Last spring most analysts felt that a tax increase
was essential.5 Chairman William McChesney Martin
of the Federal Reserve Board told the American
Society of Newspapers Editors in late April that:
“We must have a tax increase, reduce the budgetary
deficit and correct the adverse balance of payments..
Despite the strong feeling that a tax increase was
essential, once the tax was passed many analysts
felt that the action was too vigorous, and a fear of
“overkill” developed. In the August 5 issue of U.S.
News and World Report, Arthur Okun, the Presi-
dent’s chief economic adviser, stated, “I know of no
one who would say now that our worries are still
those of expanding too fast. If anything, the balance
has shifted a bit in the other direction.” Most econ-
ometric models of the economy indicated a quick
and marked slowing in activity as a result of the
fiscal a c t i on. The University of Pennsylvania’s
Wharton School model was typical; it forecast on
May 23 that if the fiscal package were adopted on
July 1, total spending would rise at an $8.7 billion
annual rate from the second to the third quarter
compared with the $21 billion rate in the first half.
Also, it was predicted that most of the increase in
spending would be matched by price rises, and total
real production would change little.
Reflecting the marked shift in sentiment and ex-
pectations after the tax increase and cut of planned
Government spending, monetary policy was relaxed.
The Federal Open Market Committee’s instructions
to the desk manager on July 16 stated in part, “The
new fiscal restraint measures are expected to con-
tribute to a considerable moderation of the rate of
advance in aggregate demands.” The desk manager
was asked to conduct operations “. ..with a view to
accommodating the tendency toward somewhat less
firm conditions in the money market...”°
5
1n a speech in late March, Professor Paul Samuelson stated
that “tax increase is needed to check the exuberant and
inflationary trends in the economy.” In May, Professor Paul
McCracken said “the tax increase mnst be passed; the basic
need is for a policy of disinflation to cool the overheated
domestic economy and regain an environment in which
there is some possibility of less costly wage settlements”
6Federal Reserve Bulletin, October 1968, p. 866.
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Interest rates moved lower during the summer,
partly in response to the new expectations of less
Government borrowing, of less rapid increases in total
spending and of reduced inflationary pressures.
Three-month Treasury bill rates declined from about
5.75 per cent in mid-May to around 5.00 per cent
in mid-August. Yields on highest-grade corporate
bonds went from about 6.30 per cent to less than
6.00 per cent. Following the decline in market in-
terest rates, the Federal Reserve Banks lowered the
discount rate from 5½per cent to 5¼per cent in
August. In the fall it gradually became apparent
that spending was not slowing abruptly, and market
interest rates rose, retracing most of the earlier
declines by early December.
Despite the moderate decline of interest rates in
June and July, it now appears that during the sum-
mer months there was a shift in monetary influence
toward less stimulus. Because of the tax increase and
spending cuts, the Federal Government borrowed
less than it otherwise would have. Other demands
for credit became less intense, perhaps reflecting a
lowering of expectations for future economic activity
and prices. As a result, while interest rates declined
from May to August, the rate of System purchases
of securities was not accelerated. Total Federal Re-
serve credit continued to increase at roughly the 10
per cent annual rate that it had risen since early
1967. Similarly, the monetary base continued to rise
at the 8 per cent rate of the earlier period.
A reduced rate of money expansion after July re-
flected primarily the fact that more of bank reserves
and the monetary base were utilized for non-
monetary purposes. Treasury deposits in member
banks, which are not included in the money stock
but which must be supported by the base, rose from
a low level of about $1.5 billion in early July to
about $5 billion in November. Time deposits in com-
mercial banks, which also are supported by the base
but are not money, began rising rapidly after mid-
year when market interest rates on competitive in~
struments fell below Regulation Q ceilings which
banks are permitted to pay on time deposits. Time
deposits, after climbing at a 5 per cent annual rate
in the first half of 1968, increased at an 18 per cent
rate from July to November.
Money Stock
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As a result, the money supply of the nation, de-
fined as private demand deposits and currency, rose
at a 3.5 per cent rate from July to November after
increasing at a 7,4 per cent rate from early 1967 to
July 1968. The demand deposit component of money
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Table V
Growth Rates of Selected Monetary Aggregates
lAnnual Roles of Change)
July 68 Jon. 67 1937
to to to
Nov. 681 July 68 1966
federal Resor’.e credit 10.0 9.8’~ 7.7~-
Total Mombor Bark Rescues 9.5 7.6 3.2
Reser,es Available to’
Private Demand Deposils 1.8 6.4 1.6
Monetary Base 6.2 5.9 3.2
Demand Deposit
Component of Money 2.6 7.6 2.2
Money Stock 3.5 7.4 2.4
Money Stock plus
tme Deposits 10.7 9.5 6.0
Bank Crodit 17.0 10.6 6.9
Time Depesils 18.2 11.8 12.1
Lcrqe COr 40.0 13.9 —
Othor lime &
Savings 16.0 11.6 —
‘i~.tlmated.
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rose at a 2.6 per cent annual rate from July to No-
vember, following a 7.6 per cent rate of increase in
the previous eighteen months. Broader measures, such
as bank credit and money plus time deposits, were
heavily affected by the reintermediation of time de-
posits and rose at even faster rates than before (See
Table V).
Economic Activity Since Mid~Y ear
Despite the change in fiscal policy at mid-year
and the more restrictive monetary developments
that began in July, spending continued to rise at
an excessive rate during the last half of 1968.
Total demands for goods and services rose at a 9 per
cent annual rate in the third quarter, and preliminary
figures for October and early November indicate that
a rapid pace was maintained early in the final quar-
ter. The slightly reduced pace in spending from the
11 per cent rate of increase during the first half of
1968 to the 9 per cent rate after mid-year was
accounted for by a shift from stockpiling of steel
before the strike was averted to inventory reductions
afterwards. Final sales, i.e., spending other than for
inventories, has continued to rise rapidly. Final sales
increased at a 10 per cent annual rate in the third
quarter, about the same as in the first half.
With increases in spending continuing to outpace
growth in capacity, inflationary pressures continued
strong after mid-year. Preliminary data indicate that
real output has risen at about a 5 per cent annual
rate and overall prices at nearly a 4 per cent rate
since the second quarter.
Continued spending at an excessive rate in the
July to early November period, despite earlier ex-
pectations of a quick and marked slowing after the
tax increase, was not inconsistent with stabilization
actions taken. Monetary growth was very rapid until
July, and the expansionary effects of such growth
usually continue to be strong for about five months
after it moderates. Fiscal actions were not large com-
pared with the size of the economy, and much of
their effect was either delayed in implementation or
could easily be offset.
The impact of monetary influence on spending
may have been very expansive in the third and
early fourth quarters of 1968. From January 1967 to
July 1968, the money stock had risen at a 7 per cent
annual rate, about three times the trend rate from
1957 to 1966, Studies indicate that changes in the
growth rate of the stock of money have a significant
effect on changes in the growth of spending, with
much of the impact coming in the following two
quarters.’ Hence, even though monetary expansion
slowed around mid-July, monetary influence during
most of the last half of 1968 probably continued to
be excessively stimulative.
Because of the financing constraint, questions have
been raised as to the strength of fiscal actions alone
in resisting inflation. Higher taxes may merely re-
7
See “Monetary and Fiscal Actions: A Test of Their Relative
Importance In Economic Stabilization,” by Leonall C. Ander-
sen and Jerry L. Jordan in the Noveisiber 1968 issue of
this Review.
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Page 12place borrowing from the public, leaving total spend-
ing, public and private, about unchanged. Similarly,
a drop in Government spending may be offset by
more private spending since the Government bor-
rows less from the private sector. It has been found
that “. . . either the commonly used measures of fiscal
influence do not correctly indicate the degree and
direction of such influence, or there was no meas-
urable net fiscal influence on total spending
The fiscal package when fully implemented would
amount to about $17 billion, or roughly 23 per cent,
of the increase in gross national product in the
previous year. 1-lowever, the fiscal stance of the
Government would still he approximately the same
as in the early ‘sixties when economic activity was
expanding rapidly. Even when the surtax and spend-
ing cuts are fully implemented, the Government’s
high-employment surplus will amount to less than 2
per cent of total spending. By comparison, in 1983
the budget surplus amounted to 2.2 per cent of
spending, and in that year spending rose faster (6
per cent) than the growth of capacity.
The fiscal package was not immediately imple-
mented in full, reducing the likelihood of a quick
slowing response in spending. It takes time to re-
duce the momentum of Federal programs, and mean-
while, activities not under the Expenditure Control
Act of 1968 have continued to expand. As a result,
total Federal expenditures have not been cut and
are now expected to be about $188 billion in fiscal
1969, 5 per cent or $10 billion above fiscal 1968,
and about $2 billion more than the level proposed
before imposition of the $6 billion cut. Further, since
the full amount of the increased tax was not with’
held from wages and salaries in 1968, much of the
impact of the tax was delayed until the spring of
1969 when the retroactive liabilities must be paid.
Some of the restraining effect of the tax on pri-
vate spending may be offset. The surtax is highly
progressive, falling mainly on those in the upper-
middle and higher income brackets. These are the
ones most likely to maintain their standards of living
after imposition of the tax, especially in view of the
high rate of saving early in 1968 and the possibly
temporary feature of the tax (scheduled to he re-
moved in mid-1969).
Summary and Outlook
Nineteen sixty-eight was the fourth successive
year of accelerating inflation. Prices rose about 4 per
cent after going up 3.2 per cent in the previous
~Ibid,p. 22.
year. By contrast, from 1957 to 1964 prices rose at a
1.6 per cent annual rate. The inflation resulted
from an excessive demand for goods and services
which was nurtured by stimulative fiscal and mone-
tary developments.
At mid-year the Government imposed a 10 per
cent surtax and provided for a $6 billion cut in
planned expenditures with a view to moderating
total spending. Monetary developments also became
less expansive; since July the money stock has in-
creased at a 3.5 per cent annual rate after rising at a
7 per cent rate in the previous eighteen months.
Despite these actions, total demand for goods and
services has remained excessive. The continued ebul-
lience has reflected the delayed effects of the earlier
rapid monetary expansion. The fiscal package was
moderate in size, slowly implemented, and partially
offset by a lower saving rate.
Economic activity in the first half of 1969 is likely
to be greatly influenced by stabilization actions al-
ready taken. The slower growth of money since July
may act as a restraining force on the growth of total
demand in early 1969. In addition, the gradual im-
plementation of the surtax and Government spend-
ing cuts will increase the probabilities of continued
moderate monetary growth and may cause some
slowing in total spending, especially in March and
April when retroactive tax payments are made.
Social security taxes are scheduled to increase on
January 1, withdrawing an estimated $1.5 billion an-
nually from employees and a similar amount from
employers.
Even if spending slows markedly in early 1969,
inflationary forces will probably remain a serious
problem throughout the year. Price markups usually
continue for an extended period after growth in
overall demand for goods and services moderates,
reflecting “cost-push” forces generated by earlier ex-
cessive spending. Some prices, such as bargained
wages and those set in other contracts, which have
been relatively inflexible during recent periods of
excessive demands, will probably move up later at
times of renegotiation. Other price adjustments have
been retarded by lack of knowledge of costs, by
public opinion, and by inertia. As these wages and
prices advance, the increase in production costs will
place upward pressure on other prices.
Because of the basic imbalances caused by past
spending excesses and price rigidities, the economy
may simultaneously experience rising prices and a
reduced rate of growth of resource use for an ex-
tended period. At such times, pressure frequently
Page 13builds up for imposing controls on wages and prices.
Such controls, however, are of little value in aiding
the economy to reach equilibrium at stable prices.
The problem of current price increases resulting from
past excessive demand is a reflection of the relative
inflexibility of prices, and imposing more rigidities
can prolong the adjustment process. Controls also
raise problems of resource allocation, interfere with
freedom, and are difficult to administer.
A major consideration for stabilization policy-
makers in 1969 will be to determine how rapidly the
excessive rate of increase of total demand should be
reduced. If fiscal and monetary actions are adopted
which will slow the rise in total demand for goods
and services abruptly, inflationary pressures may be
rapidly reduced. However, the cost in lower produc-
tion, employment, and incomes would be large. On
the other hand, if total demand is moderated slowly
enough to permit the growth in production, employ-
ment and income to continue at near their long-mn
trends, moderation of the inflationary pressures may
be a long, slow process.
Some appreciation of the task confronting policy-
makers can be obtained by reviewing the last period
when inflationary pressures were significantly dimin-
ished. From 1947 to 1953 total demand rose at an
average 8 per cent annual rate, with real product
expanding at an unsustainable 5 per cent rate and
prices at a 3 per cent rate. In the following eight
years, from 1953 to 1961, total demand grew at a
much slower 4.5 per cent rate. Average gains in real
output fell to a relatively low 2.4 per cent rate, but
price increases were only gradually reduced from the
3 per cent pace to 1.1 per cent in 1961. Inflationary
expectations may be easier to eliminate now than they
were in the fifties, since they have existed only about
four years compared with over a decade in the ‘forties
and early ‘fifties. Also, a gradual reduction of total
demand may be more effective in combating infla-
tionary expectations and less costlyin terms of reduced
real output than the actual stop-and-go influences of
the ‘fifties. Nevertheless, elimination of inflationary
pressures appears to take considerable time, with real
output falling below long-run attainable rates.
Problems of domestic economic stabilization in
1969 may be aggravated by unforeseen changes in
defense spending as international developments un-
fold. Varying moods of optimism and pessimism,
changes in tastes and preferences by consumers and
businesses, strikes, weather, institutional and legal
rigidities, and technological change all increase the
task of economic stabilization. Also, there is a con-
tinuing balance-of-payments problem which might act
as a constraint on policies designed for domestic
purposes.
Other obstacles to economic stability include in-
complete and delayed information on economic de-
velopments and a lag in effect of stabilization ac-
tions taken. A complete “fine tuning” of the economy
probably cannot be attained in the present state of
knowledge, and vigorous efforts to do so may actually
he destabilizing. However, if extremely destabilizing
actions can be avoided, we should make progress
toward the goals of a continued high level of em-
ployment and reasonable price stability in a basically
free economy.
NonMs1~N. Bowsimi
Page 14